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 Introduction 
Converging evidence coming from cognitive psychology and neuroscience research has 
demonstrated that visual imagery is not a unified and undifferentiated construct, and two separate 
subsystems, object and spatial imagery, have been reported, at both functional (Farah, Hammond, 
Levine, & Calvanio, 1988; Kosslyn, 1994; Logie, 2003) and neural levels (e.g., Kosslyn, Ganis, 
& Thompson, 2001; Mazard, Tzouio-Mazoyer, Crivello, Mazoyer, & Mellet, 2004). In the 
present study we focused on visual object imagery (which refers to mental representations of the 
visual appearance of objects, patterns and scenes, in terms of their shape, colour information, 
brightness, texture and size) and examined whether and how individual differences in object 
imagery, a stable characteristic that reflects the ability and preference in generating pictorial 
mental images of objects, affects voluntary and involuntary retrieval from autobiographical 
memory (ABM). 
The idea that visual imagery contributes to voluntary retrieval from ABM and to specific 
phenomenological aspects of the retrieved memories (e.g. vividness, specificity, relieving) has 
received strong empirical support from behavioural and neuroscientific (neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging) studies, which are reviewed first. Conversely, the results of studies on individual 
differences in visual imagery and voluntary ABMs, reviewed next, are not so clear-cut and 
straightforward. One of the reasons for these “weak” results might be the way individual 
differences have been conceived and measured, that is as the very limited and specific ability to 
generate vivid visual images on demand. In this study we considered individual differences in 
visual imagery in terms of a broader visual cognitive style (visual object imagery).  Finally, so far 
no study has systematically examined the role of visual imagery in the involuntary retrieval of 
ABMs (reviewed in the last section of the introduction). The present study was planned to 
overcome these limits and shed light on the relationship between ABMs and visual imagery, 
using an individual differences approach. In the following, we briefly review the relevant 
literature on these aspects. 
Visual imagery and voluntary autobiographical memory 
Autobiographical memory (ABM) refers to memory of personal past and “it is of 
fundamental significance for the self, for emotions, and for the experience of personhood, that is for 
the experience of enduring as an individual, in a culture, over time” (Conway & Pleydell-Peirce, 
2000, p.261).  
Most scholars agree that autobiographical memory is a complex cognitive function that 
involves and requires many other functionally and neurally distinct but interacting processes, of 
which visual imagery represents a very important component (e.g.,  the multiple-systems model, 
Rubin, 2005, 2006; Brewer, 1988; Conway, 1988). 
Behavioural studies have consistently reported that almost all voluntary ABMs are 
accompanied by visual imagery (Brewer, 1986; Rubin, 2005, 2006) and neuroimaging studies 
have shown that regions involved in visuospatial processing and visual imagery, including 
occipital regions, are engaged in the retrieval of ABMs (see for a meta-analysis, Svoboda, 
McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). Studies on the phenomenology of ABMs have also revealed that 
visual imagery contributes to several phenomenological properties of autobiographical memory, 
such as vivid remembering (e.g., Brewer, 1986; Greenberg & Rubin, 2003), memory specificity 
(e.g., Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Williams, Healy & Ellis, 1999) and the recollective experience 
during retrieval (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Greenberg & Rubin, 2003; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 
2003). People are more likely to believe their personal memories when they are accompanied by 
clear and vivid visual images (e.g., Rubin et al., 2003; Greenberg & Knowlton, 2014) although 
evidence has been reported that visual imagery may also easily induce false autobiographical 
beliefs and memories (e.g., Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003).  
 
According to the hierarchical model developed by Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000), 
voluntary retrieval of ABMs occurs following a top-down direction, which starts from the very top 
abstract level, such as life time period information, down to general events, to end up with the 
memory for the specific event. This generative process is effortful and time-consuming, usually 
taking up to 10/12 sec (e.g., Daaselar, Rice, Greenberg, Cabeza, LaBar, & Rubin, 2008; Rubin, 
1998) and always more than 5 sec (see, e.g., Conway, 1990). Compared to this process, direct 
retrieval of event-specific knowledge is considered to occur only rarely, although recent findings 
suggested that it might be more common (>50%) than expected (Uzer, Lee & Brown, 2012). 
 According to the results of several studies, the generation of mental images, especially 
visual images, would facilitate the intentional retrieval search through the hierarchical structure of 
ABM (Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Greenberg & Rubin, 2003; Ogden, 
1993; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014; Rubin & Schulkind, 1997; Williams et al., 1999). In the 
voluntary retrieval of ABMs, the detailed sensory-perceptual information and the context-rich 
themes provided by visual images would enhance access to knowledge-base structures and help the 
rapid generation of multiple intermediate descriptions that act as powerful indexes in the search for 
specific-event memories.  
Empirical support to this claim comes from experimental studies on the effects of the 
imageability of the cue on the retrieval of ABMs (Mortensen, Berntsen & Bohn, 2014; Rasmussen 
& Berntsen, 2014;Williams  et al., 1999) and from neuropsychological studies on patients with 
brain damage to areas known to support visual imagery (Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Ogden, 1993; 
see also Rubin & Greenberg, 1998).   
For example, in an experimental study on the effects of cue imageability on the voluntary 
retrieval of ABMs, Williams et al. (1999) reported a clear advantage of high (6.70 sec) vs. low-
imageable (11.27 sec) cues, in speeding the retrieval processes with a specific contribution of visual 
imagery, compared to other kinds of imagery, in predicting the number of specific memories, as 
well as their retrieval times  
Lesion studies reported retrograde amnesia in association with relatively isolated damage to 
the striate and extrastriate cortices (Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Ogden, 1993; see also Rubin & 
Greenberg, 1998). In particular, Conway and Fthenaki (2000) noted that patients with impaired 
visual imagery abilities due to occipital lobes damage could also exhibit retrograde amnesia of 
specific events, with a specific difficulty in processing the visual aspects of the memories. The same 
patients, however, did not show impaired memory for lifetime periods or general event knowledge.  
Altogether, these results suggest that intact visual imagery is crucial in voluntary retrieval of 
ABMs and that the ability to generate visual images is necessary for the transformation of generic 
personal knowledge into specific personal memories.  
Individual differences in visual imagery  
If it is true that visual imagery plays a key role in the voluntary retrieval of ABMs, one 
might expect that individual differences in visual imagery should be also related to differences in 
ABMs. However, and somehow surprisingly, only a few studies addressed this issue, and they 
focused almost exclusively on the phenomenological aspects of ABMs, with contradictory results.  
In one of the first studies, D’Argembeau and van der Linden (2006)  found that higher levels 
of vividness of visual imagery predicted richness of sensory details in memory, as well as clarity of 
representation of temporal information. However, no significant associations with any other 
relevant phenomenological properties of ABMs were found (such as the experience of reliving, the 
intensity of the emotion experienced at retrieval, the personal importance of memory). In a very 
recent study, Greenberg and Knowlton (2014) found no significant association between individual 
differences in vividness of visual mental images and several phenomenological properties of 
ABMs, including the experience of reliving and the amount of sensory details in memory. However, 
in the same study the researchers found that a higher tendency and preference for use of visual 
imagery was associated with a stronger sense of reliving, suggesting that different dimensions of 
visual imagery might relate to autobiographical memory in different ways, and that differences in 
the preference of use of visual imagery may be more relevant than differences in the ability to 
generate vivid visual images.  
Contrary to these predictions, in a second study the direct comparison between 
Visualizers (those who tend and prefer to use visual imagery to perform cognitive task) and 
Verbalizers (those who tend and prefer to use linguistic strategies instead) showed no significant 
difference, as both groups had rich ABMs that came with visual imagery and did not differ in 
their ratings of reliving. According to the authors, various reasons might be advanced to explain 
this unexpected result. First, it might be that visual imagery is so important that all participants 
use it when they are recalling ABMs, even if they do not use in other tasks (as happens with 
Verbalizers). Second, and more important for our study, these findings “may hint that visualizer-
verbalizer distinction needs to be refined” (Greenberg & Knowlton, 2014, p.929). 
To this regard, in the last two decades several studies have shown that visual imagery is 
not a unified and undifferentiated construct and that Visualizers are not a homogenous group of 
individuals, as it was considered in the Greenberg and Knowlton study. Converging empirical 
evidence demonstrates the existence of two distinct visual imagery subsystems that encode and 
process visual information in different ways: an object imagery system processes the visual 
appearance of objects and scenes in terms of their shape, colour information and texture, while a 
spatial imagery system processes information on object location, spatial relations between parts 
of the object, object’s movement, and spatial transformations of different elements of the object 
(Farahet al., 1988; Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn et al., 2001; Mazard et al., 2004). Recent studies 
indicated that this dissociation is also reflected in individual differences in visual imagery 
(Kozhevnikov, Hegarty, |& Mayer, 2002; Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shepard, 2005; Vannucci & 
Mazzoni, 2009; Vannucci, Mazzoni, Chiorri & Cioli, 2008).  
Individuals with high levels of object imagery (High-OI) tend and prefer to use imagery 
to construct vivid high-resolution images of individual objects and scenes and they are facilitated 
in generating colourful pictorial mental images. They also frequently experience spontaneous 
visual images and enjoy visual pictorial representations (e.g., paintings) in their daily life. 
Compared to individuals with low levels of object imagery (Low-OI), High-OI reported a better 
performance on object imagery tasks, as recognizing degraded pictures of objects (Kozhevnikov 
et al., 2005; Vannucci et al., 2008). Conversely, they showed a below average performance on 
visuo-spatial ability tasks, which required performing mental spatial transformations (e.g., three 
dimensional mental rotation, imagined paper folding; Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010; 
Kozhevnikov et al., 2005).  
According to some recent studies, High-OI do not only have a different kind of imagery, 
but they also differ in other dimensions of cognitive functioning (e.g. perception, creativity, 
problem solving) and personality (e.g. fantasy proneness). For example, they encode and process 
both mental images and visual stimuli in a more global and holistic way compared to Low-OI 
(Vannucci et al., 2008), they show high levels of artistic creativity (Kozhevnikov, Kozhevnikov, 
Chen, & Blazhenkova, 2013), and a very good academic performance in the field of visual arts 
(Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2009, 2010).  
In summary, object imagery represents a broader construct than imagery vividness and a 
stable individual characteristic referring to the abilities/preferences and frequency of use of a 
specific type of visual imagery. In light of the findings of experimental and phenomenological 
studies on visual imagery and voluntary retrieval of ABMs reviewed above, one might argue that 
individual differences in this specific visual cognitive style might affect the processes involved in 
memory retrieval, and shape the qualities of the memories retrieved. However, to the best of our 
knowledge no previous study investigated the association between this dimension of visual 
cognitive style and autobiographical memory. 
Involuntary retrieval of ABMs 
Another aspect that has been neglected in the research on visual imagery and ABM 
concerns involuntary ABMs, namely spontaneously arising memories of personal events that 
come to mind with no deliberate attempt directed at their retrieval (Berntsen, 2009; Mace, 2007). 
However, consistent evidence has been reported that most people frequently experience 
involuntary ABMs in their daily life, especially when they are engaged in undemanding activities 
that require little attention and concentration (e.g., during relaxation and routine activities) 
(Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Kvavilashvili & Mandler, 2004). In the large majority of cases (80% or 
more) this kind of memory is elicited by easily identifiable external cues (e.g., objects, actions, 
people) (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; Berntsen & Hall, 2004).  
Involuntary retrieval of memories is currently conceived as due to a match between 
elements of the cue and central features or themes of the memory representation of past events 
(e.g., Ball, Mace, & Corona, 2007; Berntsen, 2009, 2010; Berntsen & Hall, 2004). This occurs 
through the spreading of activation in an associative network, from the representation of the cue 
to related concepts in the autobiographical memory system. In the literature, the hypothesis of a 
direct access to memory representations has been advanced for involuntary ABMs (Berntsen, 
1998; Conway, 2005; Uzer et al., 2012). However, as Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) 
proposed, the presence of a relevant proportion of involuntary memories classified as general 
(approx. 30% in Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008) seems to suggest that they are retrieved from 
the same autobiographical memory knowledge base as voluntary memories, following the same 
top-down (and probably reconstructive) pathway. In this case, though, the spreading of activation 
is not intentionally initiated but triggered automatically by the cue.  
The few studies that directly compared voluntary and involuntary retrieval of ABMs have 
shown that involuntary ABMs more frequently than voluntary ABMs refer to specific events 
(Berntsen, 1998; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008), they are accompanied by more immediate 
emotional reactions, with greater impact on mood than their voluntary counterparts (e.g., 
Berntsen & Hall, 2004), and they are also retrieved almost twice as fast as voluntary memories 
(Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
The present study 
In the present study we aimed to further investigate the role of visual imagery in the 
retrieval of ABMs by examining and comparing, for the first time, the association between different 
levels of visual object imagery and voluntary and involuntary retrieval of ABMs. Differently from 
the previous studies on individual differences in visual imagery, here we focused on a specific 
visual cognitive style, visual object imagery. Moreover, instead of limiting our investigation to the 
phenomenological properties of ABMs, we comprehensively assessed the different levels at which 
visual imagery might affect ABMs, namely number of memories, ease of retrieval (measured in 
terms of retrieval time), and phenomenological characteristics (e.g. vividness, specificity, richness 
of details, rehearsal, pleasantness, intensity of emotion at retrieval).  
Given the centrality of visual imagery in voluntary retrieval of ABMs and given the 
tendency of High-OI to spontaneously generate pictorial visual mental images, we hypothesized 
that High-OI would show facilitated voluntary retrieval of ABMs, in terms of both amount of 
memories and retrieval times.  
The perceptual-like and high-resolution mental images generated by High-OI were also 
expected to facilitate involuntary retrieval of ABMs: the spontaneous generation of personally-
relevant visual mental images, in response to the cue might enhance the match between the cue 
and the memory representation, making it easier and faster to involuntarily recall personal events.  
The analyses of retrieval times, as well as of the proportion of specific vs. general ABMs 
memories, might also contribute to address the still debated issue of the mechanisms (generative 
vs. direct) involved in voluntary and involuntary retrieval and whether and how they are affected 
by different levels of visual object imagery.  
Individual differences in the level of visual object imagery were also expected to affect the 
phenomenological properties of both voluntary and involuntary ABMs, with High-OI reporting 
more detailed and more specific ABMs than Low-OI, and recalling memories mainly as visual 
images (instead of verbal descriptions). 
Finally, given the small number of studies that have directly compared voluntary and 
involuntary ABMs within the same sample of participants, we also aimed to further investigate 
potential similarities and differences between these two kinds of memories. In line with the 
results of previous studies, it was predicted that, with respect to voluntary ABMs,  involuntary 
ABMs would be retrieved faster, they would refer more to specific events, and they would be 
associated with a stronger emotional reaction at retrieval.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students of the University of Florence (26 females; mean age: 24.80 
years, SD = 3.56 years), all native Italian speakers, volunteered to take part in the experiment. All 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The sample included 20 High-OI (13 Female) and 20 
Low-OI (13 Female) participants.  
Visual object imagery was assessed in a screening phase, in which 344 undergraduate 
students at the University of Florence completed the Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire 
(OSIQ, Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov & Motes, 2006) and the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ, Marks, 1973) in two consecutive distinct sessions (one week interval), and 
along with other questionnaires unrelated to this study. 
On the basis of the classification criteria used in earlier studies with Italian samples for 
identifying High-OI (see Vannucci et al., 2008), participants who scored above 3.5 in the 
OSIQ_OI scale and 25 or below in VVIQ were classified as High-OI and participants who scored 
below 2.5 in the OSIQ_OI and above 40 in VVIQ were classified as Low-OI. High-OI and Low-
OI participants were subsequently invited to take part in the present experiment on 
“concentration and attention”.  
 
Materials 
Screening phase 
In the screening phase in which High-OI and Low-OI were identified, participants 
completed the Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ, Blajenkova et al., 2006; adaptation 
for the Italian population in Vannucci, Cioli, Chiorri, Grazi, & Kozhevnikov, 2006) and the 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ, Marks, 1973). The OSIQ was developed to 
assess individual differences in cognitive style, namely, preference and ability to imagine objects 
(OSIQ_OI) vs. spatial relations and layouts (OSIQ_SI). OSIQ_OI items measure vividness of 
mental images, image maintenance, preference for pictorial visual representations, and self-
estimated ability to perform tasks requiring object imagery. The mean value the OSIQ_OI items 
scores is the index of the Object Imagery level, with higher scores indicating higher object 
imagery (Blajenkova et al., 2006; Vannucci et al., 2006). Previous studies reported good internal 
consistency, as well as construct, criterion and ecological validity of OSIQ-OI scores 
(Blajenkova et al., 2006; Vannucci et al., 2006). 
The VVIQ is the most frequently used measure of the vividness of visual mental images. 
It consists of 16 items and participants are asked to rate the vividness of the mental image relative 
to each item. Ratings range from 1 (image clear and vivid as a perception) to 5 (no image at all). 
VVIQ item scores summed to provide a total score and lower scores indicate higher vividness. 
 
Experimental session 
Involuntary recall. A modified version of the vigilance task developed by Schlagman and 
Kvavilashvili (2008; see also Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011) and already used in previous 
studies (Mazzoni, Vannucci, & Batool, 2014; Vannucci, Batool, Pelagatti & Mazzoni, 2014; 
Vannucci, Pelagatti, Hanczakowski , Mazzoni & Rossi Paccani, 2014) was administered, as a 
first task of the experimental session.  
The task consisted of 200 trials, presented in a continuous fixed order, each remaining on 
the screen for 3 sec. In each trial a card (approximately 21.5 x 12.5 cm in size) was shown 
depicting either a pattern of black horizontal (non-target stimuli) or black vertical lines (target 
stimuli). Target stimuli appeared on 9 trials, presented at fairly long and irregular intervals. 
Word-phrases (e.g., “relaxing on a beach”, “supportive friend”) in 18-CPI Arial font were shown 
in the middle of the card on 75 trials.1 These stimuli were taken from the Italian adaptation of a 
standardized pool of 800 word-phrases developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and 
already successfully used in previous studies on involuntary memories. In the adaptation, the 
original 800 word-phrases had been evaluated by 11 independent judges for concreteness and 
familiarity on a 7-point scale (1 “low” - 7 “high”). In the present study only word-phrases rated 
as concrete and familiar (rating 5-7) were used. Of these cues, 50 were neutral, 15 positive and 
10 negative2. 
Voluntary recall. A total of 18 new word-phrases (15 neutral, 3 positive and 0 negative) 
were selected from the general pool. These were not shown in the involuntary recall task and 
were randomly presented in the voluntary recall task. These cue word-phrases were shown in 18-
CPI Arial font in the middle of cards taken from the non-target stimuli in the vigilance task 
(depicting black horizontal lines). The word-phrases used in the voluntary task did not differ in 
familiarity, concreteness and valence from the ones used in the involuntary task. Each cue trial 
lasted 60 seconds (as in Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
Memory characteristics questionnaire. At the end of each recall tasks (either involuntary 
or voluntary) participants recorded details of each memory on a questionnaire, adapted from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Compared to Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008), we employed a longer presentation time and a reduced 
number of cues to make the task more effective. A previous study (Vannucci, Pelagatti et al., 2014) had 
shown that few cues are indeed more effective than many cues in eliciting involuntary ABMs. As for the 
presentation time, we decided for 3 sec on the bases of pilot data (n = 10), showing that 3 sec were more 
effective than 1.5 sec.  
 
2	  In the present study we selected only a subsample of the italian adaptation of the standardized pool of 800 
word-phrases developed by Schlagman & Kvavilashvili (2008). In particular we selected only word-phrases 
rated as concrete and familiar (rating 5-7). The majority of these words was neutral and only a few of them 
were positive or negative. As a further check, we re-analyzed the data taking into account only neutral cues 
and the results did not change, suggesting that no substantive bias could have been introduced by the 
emotional valence of the cues. 
one used by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008) and modified for the present study. In 
particular, participants rated vividness of memory (1 = very vague, almost no image at all; 7 = 
very vivid, almost like normal vision), the richness of its details (1 = very few; 7 = many), how 
often the memory had been thought of/rehearsed before (1 = never; 5 = many times), how 
pleasant or unpleasant the memory event was (1 = very unpleasant; 3 = neutral; 5 = very 
pleasant), the intensity of the emotional response associated with remembering of the event (1 = 
no intense at all; 5 = very intense). They were also asked whether the remembered event was 
general or specific,3 whether it came to their mind in words or images and they had to indicate 
the period of their life in which the event occurred (childhood-remote memories, adolescence, 
adulthood). 
Procedure 
In the screening phase, participants were administered the paper-and-pencil instruments in 
two consecutive mass testing session (one week interval).  
In the experimental session, participants were tested individually. All participants 
performed first the involuntary memory task and then, after two hours, the voluntary memory 
task, in order to reduce the risk that participants tried to voluntarily recall memories also during 
the vigilance task, being aware of our interest in memory (for a similar task order, see also 
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Participants received instructions on how to identify a general and a specific memory. As in previous 
studies on IAMs (see Bentsen, 1996, 1998, Bentsen & Hall, 2004), participants were told that a remembered 
situation could take two forms, specific and general.  
A specific memory refers to a single episode/event that could be allocated a specific time and place in the 
past and that had lasted less than a day. Examples were provided (e.g. “yesterday when you went shopping in 
the x store” or  “that particular day when your dog ran away when you took it for a walk”). 
A general memory refers to a generalized representation that summarizes the properties of many similar 
events (e.g. “going shopping in the x store” or “walking in the woods”.). General memories might refer to 
either extended events that lasted for a longer period of time (e.g., a holiday on the mountains) or repeated 
events (e.g., using the bus to go to work; going to the beach every summer during childhood). All 
participants were able to provide correct examples of specific and general memories.  
 
	  
After completing the informed consent form, in the involuntary recall task participants 
were told that they would take part in a study examining concentration using a vigilance task. In 
this task they would be asked to detect target stimuli (vertical lines) among a large number of 
non-target stimuli (horizontal lines), by saying ‘‘yes’’ out loud each time they detected a target 
stimulus. They were told that short sentences would also appear on the screen, but they were 
irrelevant, and thus could be ignored, as participants were in the ‘line detection’ group, not in the 
‘word detection’ group (this was a cover story, the word-detection group did not exist). 
Participants were also informed that the task was quite monotonous and they could find 
themselves thinking about other things (thoughts, plans about the future, past experiences, etc.), 
which was normal. They were told that if any mental content (mental contents could refer to 
thoughts, intentions, plans for the future, past experiences, etc.) crossed their mind during the 
task, they should click the mouse to interrupt the presentation and write a short sentence 
describing their mental content. They were informed that this initial brief description of the 
mental content should be sufficient to remind them of that specific mental content at a later point 
in time. They were also asked to specify whether the content came from their thoughts, from the 
external environment or from a word-phrase shown on the screen (if so, they should specify 
which one).  
After all stimuli had been presented and all mental contents recorded, participants were 
informed about the nature of involuntary memories, saw their short sentences and categorized 
them as involuntary memories or non-memory contents (here more generically referred to as 
‘thoughts’). After the categorization task, they were asked to complete for each of the involuntary 
memories the questionnaire on memory characteristics. Clicking the mouse stopped the time, 
which was recorded by the computer. The task lasted approximately 60 to 90 min. 
In the voluntary recall task, participants were called back in the same location after two 
hours, and asked to perform a voluntary recall task. They were told to deliberately retrieve a past 
memory associated with each word presented on the screen. They were informed that each word-
phrase would remain on the screen for 60 seconds and that they should try to recall a past 
memory as quickly as possible within that time. As in Schlagman and Kvavilashvili (2008), it 
was clarified that memories could be general or specific, recent or remote. Participants were 
instructed to click the mouse as soon as the memory came to their mind. If participants were 
unable to recall a past memory within 60 sec., the computer automatically moved onto the next 
trial. Once all trials had been presented, the participants completed the memory characteristics 
questionnaire for each reported memory. The voluntary recall task lasted approximately 30 min. 
 
Results  
Number of ABMs and non-memory contents (“thoughts”).  
During the vigilance task participants were asked to report all task-unrelated mental contents 
that came into their mind4. The mean values and standard deviations of the total number of mental 
contents (which included IAMs and “thoughts”) are reported in Table 1, as well as mean values and 
standard deviations of the number of voluntary ABMs. 
[Table 1] 
Independent samples t-tests were performed to compare involuntary ABMs, thoughts, and 
voluntary ABMs between High-OI and Low-OI groups. The Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) step-
up false discovery rate-controlling procedure was used to adjust the p-values for multiple 
comparisons. 
As shown in Table 1, the mean number of task-unrelated mental contents (involuntary 
memories and involuntary thoughts together) was significantly higher in the High-OI group than in 
the Low-OI group, t(38) = 3.91, adjusted-p = .001, d = 1.27. The High-OI group reported a 
significantly higher number of involuntary ABMs, t (38) = 3.87, adjusted-p = .001, d = 1.26, and 
thoughts, t (38) = 3.16, adjusted-p = .004, d = 1.03, than Low-OI.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Classification of mental contents as memories or other mental contents (thoughts) was done 
relatively easily and quickly.	  
A similar pattern was obtained when analyses were limited to involuntary ABMs and 
thoughts triggered by the word-phrase cues: High-OI reported a higher number of involuntary 
ABMs triggered by the cues compared to Low-OI, t (38) = 3.59, adjusted-p = .001, d = 1.16,  and a 
higher number of thoughts, t (38) = 2.82, adjusted-p = .008, d = 0.91 (Table 1). 
As for involuntary ABMs, we also compared in the two groups the mean proportion of 
memories that were reported to have a trigger. Triggers could be a cue, a thought or an 
environmental stimulus. t-tests for independent samples did not reveal any significant difference 
between High-OI and Low-OI in the mean proportion of IAMs triggered either by cues (.88±.16 vs 
.79±.35), t(36) = 1.03, p = .308, d = 0.35, or by thoughts (.10±.15 vs .20±.34), t(36) = -1.11, p 
=.273, d =-0.37. 
In the voluntary recall task, the High-OI group reported a significantly higher number of 
ABMs than the Low-OI group, t (38) = 3.28, adjusted-p = .002, d = 1.06 (Table 1). The discrepancy 
in the number of ABMs between High-OI and Low-OI in the involuntary condition did not 
substantially differ from that in the voluntary condition, as the 95% confidence intervals of the two 
effect sizes overlapped (0.58-1.94 and 0.40-1.72, respectively). 
Retrieval times 
For those involuntary ABMs that participants reported as being triggered by cues presented 
on the screen, we could calculate retrieval times (RTs, as in Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). 
RTs were computed as the time from the present (clicked on) trial, back to the trial that presented 
the word-phrase cue that was reported by the participant to have triggered the involuntary memory. 
For example, if a participant clicked on Trial 23 and the RT for that trial was 0.55 sec., and the 
word that triggered the memory was two trials back, then 6.00 sec. would be added (i.e., 3 sec. per 
trial), to make a retrieval time of 6.55 sec. For the voluntary recall task, RTs were calculated from 
the onset of the stimulus (the cue phrase) to the time the participants pressed a key indicating they 
retrieved a memory. For each participant we computed the median RT for involuntary and 
voluntary ABMs. Means and standard deviations of median RTs for involuntary and voluntary 
ABMs, as well as for thoughts in High-OI and Low-OI, are shown in Table 2.  
[Table 2] 
A 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA, with Group (High-OI and Low-OI) and Memory type 
(voluntary vs. involuntary) as independent variables was carried out on the RTs of all memories. 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Memory type, as RTs for involuntary ABMs 
were significantly faster than RTs of voluntary ABMs, F(1,32) = 4.33, adjusted-p = .046, η2 = 
.06, and a significant main effect of Group, as RTs were almost twice as fast in High-OI than in 
Low-OI, F (1,32) = 12.10, adjusted-p = .001, η2 = .17. The interaction between Group and 
Memory type was not significant (Table 2). 
The same 2 x 2 mixed model ANOVA was separately carried out on RTs of specific and 
general memories. In either case only the main effect of Group was significant: RTs were faster 
in High-OI than in Low-OI both for specific memories, F (1,25) = 18.40, adjusted-p = .001, η2 = 
.26, and general memories, F (1,18) = 13.31, adjusted-p = .002, η2 = .32. The main effect of 
Memory type and the interaction were not significant (Table 2).  
No significant difference was found between High-OI and Low-OI on the RTs of thoughts 
(M= 3.920 sec, SD = 1.83 vs M= 4.54, SD= 1.40) ,t (31) = - 1,03, p = .310, d = 0.37.  
Characteristics of ABMs 
Mean values and standard deviations of the various phenomenological characteristics for 
involuntary and voluntary ABMs in High-OI and Low-OI are shown in Table 2. Results are 
organized by characteristic.  
For the phenomenological characteristics of memories, several 2 x 2 mixed model 
ANOVAs, with Group (High-OI and Low-OI) and Memory type (voluntary vs. involuntary) as 
independent variables, were carried out. A step-up false discovery rate-controlling procedure 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) was used to control the inflation of Type I error due to multiple 
comparisons. 
The mixed model ANOVA conducted on the mean rating of vividness showed that High-
OI reported more vivid memories compared to Low-OI, F (1, 36) = 6.21, p = .025, η2 = .12. 
Moreover, involuntary ABMs were more vivid compared to voluntary ABMs, F (1, 36) = 28.51, 
p < .001, η2 = .16, and the two-way interaction was significant, F (1, 36) = 11.21, p = .006, η2 = 
.07: High-OI reported more vivid voluntary ABMs compared to Low-OI, while no significant 
differences were found for involuntary ABMs. 
High-OI also reported more detailed ABMs compared with Low-OI, F (1, 36) = 30.18, p 
< .001, η2 = .39. Involuntary ABMs were more detailed than voluntary memories, F (1, 36) = 
5.86, p = .027, η2 = .04. 
Significant differences between High-OI and Low-OI were also found in the proportion of 
ABMs recalled as mental images, F (1, 36) = 12.38, p = .005, η2 = .17. High-OI reported a 
significantly higher proportion compared to Low-OI. No other effects were significant. 
As for the period of life in which the event occurred, High-OI reported a higher 
proportion of childhood/remote memories compared to Low-OI, F (1, 36) = 5.69, p = .028, η2 = 
.09. A higher proportion of remote childhood memories was reported in voluntary ABMs 
compared to the involuntary counterpart, F (1, 36) = 8.97, p = .011, η2 = .09. The two-way 
interaction was also significant: High-OI reported a higher proportion of remote involuntary 
ABMs, compared to Low-OI, F (1, 36) = 6.26, p = .025, η2 = .06, but no significant differences 
between the two groups were found for voluntary memories. 
No significant differences between High-OI and Low-OI were found in the intensity of 
the emotional reaction experienced during the retrieval, but involuntary ABMs were associated 
with a more intense emotional reaction during retrieval compared to voluntary ABMs, F (1, 34) = 
9.70, p = .010, η2 = .08. Similarly, no significant differences were found between the two groups 
in the frequency of rehearsal of memories and in the proportion of specific memories, but 
involuntary ABMs were more rehearsed than voluntary ABMs, F (1, 36) = 19.57, p < .001, η2 = 
.10, and there was a significantly higher proportion of specific memories, F (1, 36) = 6.77, p = 
.024, η2 = .04. 
 
Discussion  
The major aim of the present study was to systematically investigate the association 
between a specific visual imagery style, namely visual object imagery, and the voluntary and 
involuntary retrieval of ABMs. We also aimed to further investigate similarities and differences 
between voluntary and involuntary ABMs. 
Overall our results show that people who, as a cognitive style, tend to use visual object 
imagery in their life (i.e., High-OI individuals) are facilitated in remembering their personal past, 
showing an advantage for both voluntary and involuntary ABMs. High-OI remembered more 
personal memories and with shorter retrieval times compared to Low-OI. Moreover, and 
consistent with their visual style, High-OI produced more detailed memories (higher amount of 
perceptual/sensory details), which were mainly recalled as visual images, and they retrieved more 
remote/childhood involuntary ABMs compared to Low-OI.  
Theoretical implications for voluntary retrieval  
The advantage shown by High-OI in voluntary recall of ABMs is consistent with the 
results of previous behavioural and neuroimaging studies on healthy subjects and 
neuropsychology patients, showing that voluntary retrieval of ABMs relies heavily on the visual 
modality (e.g., Conway, 1988, 1990; Daselaar et al., 2008; Svoboda et al., 2006) and that visual 
imagery contributes to several aspects of ABM, including their recollective quality (Greenberg & 
Rubin, 2003; Rubin, 2005, 2006), their vividness (e.g., D’Argembeaus & van der Linden, 2006), 
as well as the easiness (retrieval times) of retrieval (Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014; Williams et 
al., 1999). Finding that high object imagery helps (both in terms of number and speed) voluntary 
retrieval of autobiographical memories supports the claim (e.g., Williams et al., 1999) that the 
creation of mental images facilitates retrieval of ABMs via increasing the ease and speed of 
search through the hierarchical structure of ABM (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). The 
presence of a substantial percentage of general memories in both groups is consistent with the 
idea that voluntary ABMs are retrieved by both High-OI and Low-OI following a top-down 
hierarchy. 
Moreover, we found that the advantage of High-OI in terms of number of memories and 
speed of retrieval was not limited to “specific” memories, but also extended to “general” 
memories. This confirms that using visual images speeds access at all levels of the hierarchical 
structure of ABM, not just at the level of event-specific knowledge. While our data provide 
empirical support for a generative/hierarchical retrieval process, a closer look at retrieval times 
for specific memories, which were very short, seems to suggest that the advantage in High-OI 
could also be due to direct retrieval (e.g., Barsalou, 1988; Conway, 1990; Haque & Conway, 
2001). For voluntary specific memories (the majority of memories) High-OI reported an average 
median retrieval time of 3.28 sec., consistent with the use of direct retrieval. In this case the cue 
would directly activate event specific knowledge and the access might proceed bottom-up rather 
than top-down within the ABM hierarchical structure. For specific memories Low-OI 
participants reported an average median retrieval time of 5.09 sec. and 14% of them reported a 
median retrieval time under 3 sec. This pattern of results becomes even clearer when we calculate 
for each participant the proportion of memories recalled within 2/2.5 sec., which for High-OI is 
36%, whereas in Low-OI is 11%, with 69% of participants reporting no memories with retrieval 
time under 2.5 sec. 
These findings for High-OI suggest that the generation of detailed and perceptual-like 
mental images in response to experimenter-provided cues might not only speed up the process of 
searching for a memory along the top-down hierarchy, but it may also stimulate a different, fast 
and automatic, direct access to the concrete sensory-perceptual fragments of information 
represented in the memory of a specific event.  
Although direct retrieval has been so far considered to occur more rarely than generative 
retrieval (Barsalou, 1988; Conway, 1990; Haque & Conway, 2001), according to the results of a 
more recent study by Uzer et al. (2012) direct retrieval might be indeed more common (> 50%) 
than previously reported, with participants being more likely to use direct retrieval when they are 
cued with objects than when they are cued with emotions, in line with the hypothesis that event 
memories are more likely to be indexed by concrete information than by abstract concepts such 
as feelings (see also, Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Fitzgerald, 1980). Uzer et al. (2012) reasonably 
suggested that averaging retrieval times could hide the frequency with which direct retrieval 
occurs, and thus makes it impossible to examine the use of both retrieval processes (direct and 
generative) in the same participant. 
In the case of High-OI, the cue might trigger a detailed, concrete mental image, that in 
turn, might favour the direct activation of event-specific information, thus bypassing the need to 
search through the hierarchical structure of autobiographical memory. 
In some previous studies, high-imageable cue words facilitated access to more specific 
memories, compared to low-imageable cue words (e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014; Williams 
et al., 1999). Williams et al. (1999) showed that the visual imageability of the cue-word was a 
significant predictor of specificity of voluntary ABMs. In our study we did not find any 
significant differences between High-OI and Low-OI in the proportion of specific memories, 
either in the voluntary or involuntary recall tasks. On the one hand, the inconsistency in the 
results might depend on the different measures of specificity used in the studies (we asked 
participants to classify their memories as “specific” or “general”, instead of using a scale of 
specificity). On the other hand, it might be that High-OI and Low-OI do not differ in the 
probability to recall specific memories but more globally in how easily they access their ABMs 
and in the mechanism used to access them (as suggested by the different patterns in the retrieval 
times). It should be also considered that different aspects of visual imagery might relate to 
autobiographical memory in different ways, so that visual imageability of the cues and object 
imagery as an individual trait might relate differently to ABM retrieval.  
Theoretical implications for involuntary retrieval 
In the present study we found an advantage of High-OI also in involuntary retrieval of 
ABMs, namely for those memories that come to mind spontaneously without any conscious or 
deliberate attempt to retrieve them (for a review, Berntsen, 2009, 2010). In involuntary recall 
tasks, High-OI were able to produce more involuntary ABMs compared to low-OI, and their 
retrieval times were almost twice as fast as those of Low-OI. 
According to the current models on involuntary retrieval, a memory is reactivated through 
a spreading of activation occurring automatically, without conscious awareness and in response 
to some accidental cues, with external cues (e.g., objects, actions, people) being more effective 
than internal experiences (e.g., thoughts and emotion). In particular, it is suggested that 
involuntary memories are triggered when a sufficient match occurs between elements of the cue 
and central features or themes of the memories (e.g., Ball et al., 2007; Berntsen, 2009, 2010; 
Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Schlagman, Kvavilashvili, & Schulz, 2007).  
In terms of the mechanism, the advantage shown by High-OI might be due to the 
perceptual-like properties of the visual images spontaneously generated by High-OI in response 
to cues, that might facilitate the matching between cues and memories. The notion of transfer-
appropriate processing (e.g., Roediger, 1990) would also help in predicting that concrete and 
pictorial mental images generated by High-OI in response to cues should be more effective at 
activating episodic memories, providing a greater overlap with the processing of episodes at 
encoding.  
An alternative hypothesis, which however can coexist with the previous one, is that High-
OI might automatically generate mental representations which, besides being rich in 
sensory/perceptual details, are also highly flexible and refer to personal experiences. Mental 
images can be similar to mental representations of personal events (see also Conway, 2005). 
People can create their own personal mental images of the word phrase “a glass of wine,” by 
adding elements that are personally relevant. Personally-enriched representations would increase 
the likelihood of a match with existing personal memories (for a discussion, see Mazzoni et al., 
2014).  
An alternative potential explanation of the advantage is that High OI participants search is 
faster because of a faster automatic spread of activation in the semantic network and hierarchical 
autobiographical knowledge network (Conway & Pleydell-Perce, 2000) than in the Low-OI 
group. Their greater speed of retrieval and the presence of approximately 25/30% of memories 
classified as general as opposed to specific support this explanation. However, the very short 
retrieval times reported for the specific memories by High-OI suggests that the faster access 
might be due to direct retrieval processes, which are also likely to be frequently used in this 
group. 
The shorter retrieval times reported by High-OI in both voluntary and involuntary recall 
task might be also due to High-OI being in general faster in processing information. Faster 
general information processing would then produce faster access to all memories. While this 
might in principle be the case, and speed certainly represents a crucial element in previous 
explanations of facilitated access to mental contents, our data seem to suggest that higher speed 
of processing is not the only factor at play. The procedure used in the involuntary task allowed us 
to collect response times not only for memories but also for other types of mental contents 
(intentions, considerations, generic thoughts, etc.) that were triggered by the cues. Response 
times for these mental contents were not significantly different between High-OI and Low-OI, 
suggesting that the advantage of High-OI is limited to access to memories, rather than access or 
production of mental contents in general. It seems then that the main variable is the creation of 
high quality visual mental images, which enhances speed of access specifically to memory 
representations. 
Comparison between voluntary and involuntary ABMs 
An additional aim of the present study was to further examine the similarities and 
differences between voluntary and involuntary ABMs, by comparing their retrieval processes 
(e.g. retrieval times) and their memory characteristics. 
In line with the results of previous studies, we found markedly shorter retrieval times for 
involuntary as compared to voluntary ABMs (Kvavilashvili & Schlagman, 2011; Schlagman & 
Kvavilashvili, 2008). Significant differences were also found in the phenomenology of 
memories, with involuntary ABMs being more detailed, vivid, specific, more frequently 
rehearsed and associated with a more intense emotional reaction at retrieval.  
The predominance of specific memories in involuntary recall confirms the results of 
several diary as well as experimental studies (Berntsen, 1998; Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Schlagman 
& Kvavilashvili, 2008). The stronger intensity of the emotional reaction associated with 
involuntary compared to voluntary retrieval is also consistent with the data reported in previous 
diary studies, showing that involuntary memories are accompanied by more immediate emotional 
reactions and have more impact on mood than their voluntary counterparts (Berntsen & Hall, 
2004; Rubin, Boals & Berntsen, 2008). 
 Future developments 
This is the first study examining the association between visual object imagery, measured 
as a cognitive style, and voluntary and involuntary recall of ABMs. In the present study we cued 
autobiographical memory using concrete word-phrases, which have been found to be more 
effective in triggering ABMs compared to abstract ones (e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014; 
Williams et al., 1999). Future studies might confirm the role of visual imagery by assessing 
whether the advantage shown by High-OI was selective for concrete cues, or it can also be 
observed in abstract cues, which are characterized by a lower imagery potential. Future research 
should also examine whether the advantage reported by High-OI in involuntary ABMs generated 
during a visual vigilance task is also obtained using a verbal task, like the continuous word 
association task (CWAT) developed by Ball (2007) for eliciting involuntary memories in the 
laboratory.  
Recent work (Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2014) has 
shown a facilitatory effect of visual imagery not only on the retrieval of ABMs but also on the 
construction of future events (e.g. participants were asked not only to retrieve past specific 
events, but also to imagine future ones), although the effect was stronger for past relative to 
future events. In our study, High-OI reported a higher amount of non-memory contents (called 
thoughts) in the vigilance task, compared to Low-OI. Since this category of mental contents was 
very heterogeneous, as it included fantasies, plans for the future, concerns, etc., it was difficult to 
make a meaningful comparison with involuntary autobiographical memories. Future studies 
should systematically verify whether the advantage reported by High-OI in accessing their 
personal past does also extend to the construction of future events and assess the level (s) at 
which the effect occur (e.g. amount of future events, retrieval times, phenomenological 
characteristics of the events).  
Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov (2010) also reported evidence of a relationship between 
visual object imagery and emotion. In their work, many visual artists reported that their visual 
object images had strong emotional components, being emotionally driven, generated by 
emotional experiences or oriented to convey emotions. While in the present study we did not find 
significant differences between High-OI and Low-OI in the level of intensity of the emotional 
reaction associated with memory retrieval, at least in part these findings might be due to the fact 
that most of our word-phrase cues were neutral. Using an equal number of neutral and emotional 
cues, both negative and positive word-phrases, can help to systematically address this issue. 
Other results reported in the present study deserve future attention and investigation. The 
retrieval times reported by High-OI in both recall tasks seem to suggest that one of the 
differences between High-OI and Low-OI might be a facilitated direct retrieval to event-specific 
representations. Given the relevance of these results for understanding not only the way High-OI 
and Low-OI retrieve memories, but also the frequency of use of direct retrieval, direct retrieval 
should be more systematically examined, possibly including different and converging methods to 
assess and differentiate generative and direct retrieval (see for example Uzer et al, 2012). 
Finally, in our study we focused on ordinary, daily-life voluntary and involuntary ABMs. 
Future studies might extend the investigation to unpleasant and unwanted intrusive 
memories/images for negative or adverse material. The results of the few studies that investigated 
the association between individual differences in mental imagery and intrusive memories, 
generally suggest that some dimensions of mental imagery (e.g. vividness of mental images, in 
Morina, Leibold & Ehring, 2013; preference for visual processing compared to verbal processing 
in Krans, Näring, Speckens, & Becker, 2011) might contribute to the development of intrusive 
memories following exposure to traumatic events, making some individuals at a higher risk for 
post-stressor intrusive memories. However, as recently discussed by Kvavilashvili (2014), 
“although ordinary involuntary autobiographical memories and intrusive memories are similar in 
terms of their spontaneous nature they are different in a number of ways” (p. 102), and they refer 
to distinct phenomena, making any generalization of results from involuntary ABMs to intrusive 
memories rather problematic.  
 
Conclusions 
In summary, the results of this study represent an important contribution in understanding 
the role played by visual imagery in both voluntary and involuntary retrieval of ABMs. In 
particular, the present findings provide for the first time clear evidence that pre-existing 
individual differences in visual object imagery style might strongly affect the processes involved 
not only in voluntary but also in involuntary retrieval of ABMs, and shape the qualities of the 
memory retrieved. The results also suggest that high object imagers might use direct retrieval 
more often, a result that deserves further investigation. 
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Table 1 
 
Means, standard deviations, results of significance tests and effect sizes of the comparison of High Object Imagers (High-OI, n=20) and Low 
Object Imagers (Low-OI, n=20) on the number of mental contents, involuntary and voluntary autobiographical memories (ABMs), non-memory 
contents (thoughts) and proportion of memories and thoughts triggered by a specific stimulus. 
 
Variable 
High-OI  Low-OI 
t df pBH d M SD  M SD 
Vigilance task          
Number of all task-unrelated mental contents 22.35 14.11  8.35 6.67 3.91 38 .001 1.27 
Number of involuntary ABMs 10.65 7.79  3.40 2.42 3.87 38  .001  1.26 
Number of involuntary ABMs triggered by the cue 9.70 7.96  2.85 2.43 3.59 38 .001  1.16 
Number of thoughts 11.70 7.64  4.95 5.31 3.16 38 .004  1.03 
Number of thoughts triggered by the cue 7.50 6.36  2.75 3.68 2.82 38 .008  0.91 
          
Voluntary recall task          
Number of ABMs 16.20 2.44  12.25 4.64 3.28 38 .002 1.06 
Note: M=mean: SD=standard deviation; df=degrees of freedom; pBH=p-value adjusted for multiple comparisons following the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)'s step-up false 
discovery rate-controlling procedure; t and df = t-value and degrees of freedom, respectively, from the independent sample t-test; d=Cohen's effect size for independent-sample 
mean comparisons. 
Table 2  
 
Means and standard deviations of scores in median retrieval times (RTs) and phenomenological characteristics of voluntary and involuntary 
autobiographical memories in High-OI and Low-OI and results from the Group (High-OI vs Low-OI) by Memory type (Voluntary vs 
Involuntary) factorial ANOVA. 
 
Variable High-OI  Low-OI  Group effect  Memory type effect  
Group-by-Memory type 
Interaction 
M SD  M SD  F df pBH η2  F df pBH η2  F df pBH η2 
All memories RTs       12.10 1,32 .001a .17  4.33 1,32 .046 a .06  0.92 1,32 .345a <.01  
Inv-ABMs 3,332.85 1,216.03  6,067.96 4,560.79                
Vol-ABMs 4,390.80 2,190.98  8,930.80 6,860.83                
Specific memories RTs                     
Inv-ABMs 3,218.34 1,205.58  7,736.05 5,595,99  18.40 1,25 .001a .26  2.05 1,25 .165a .04  2.28 1,25 .144a .05 
Vol-ABMs 3,280.94 1,469.87  5,430,27 1,996.62                
General memories RTs                     
Inv-ABMs 4,052.29 2,856.97  10,346.33 5,404.45  13.31 1,18 .002a .32  2.27 1,18 .149a .04  0.63 1,18 .437a .01 
Vol-ABMs 3,256.29 1,384.04  7,773.83 6,894.22                
 
Phenomenological characteristics  
Vividnessb       6.21 1,36 .025 .12  28.51 1,36 <.001 .16  11.21 1,36 .006 .07 
Inv-ABMs 5.75 0.79  5.59 0.78                
Vol-ABMs 5.48 0.90  4.37 1.07                
Detailsb       30.18 1,36 <.001 .39  5.86 1,36 .027 .04  0.50 1,36 .329 <.01 
Inv-ABMs 5.61 0.70  4.54 0.60                
Vol-ABMs 5.40 0.88  4.15 0.80                
Reharsalc       1.40 1,36 .178 .03  19.57 1,36 <.001 .10  0.48 1,36 .329 <.01 
Inv-ABMs 2.91 0.52  3.06 0.86                
Vol-ABMs 2.41 0.69  2.70 0.50                
Pleasant memoryc       1.85 1,36 .154 .03  0.01 1,36 .499 <.01  1.52 1,36 .178 .02 
Inv-ABMs 3.55 0.49  3.87 0.68                
Vol-ABMs 3.70 0.49  3.74 0.43                
Emotional Intensityc       4.00 1,34 .054 .08  9.70 1,34 .010 .08  0.01 1,34 .499 <.01 
Inv-ABMs 3.71 0.54  3.39 0.56                
Vol-ABMs 3.39 0.69  3.04 0.57                
Specificityd       0.14 1,36 .452 <.01  6.77 1,36 .024 .04  2.35 1,36 .126 .02 
Inv-ABMs 68.42 18.85  76.84 27.36                
Vol-ABMs 64.34 20.71  61.06 28.13                
In shape of imagese       12.38 1,36 .005 .17  1.90 1,36 .154 .02  1.41 1,36 .178 .02 
Inv-ABMs 93.21 13.29  72.54 31.16                
Vol-ABMs 93.91 6.57  82.06 13.86                
Childhood memoriesf       5.69 1,36 .028 .09  8.97 1,36 .011 .09  6.26 1,36 .025 .06 
Inv-ABMs 17.45 20.91  0.93 3.93                
Vol-ABMs 18.95 13.13  17.62 15.36                
Note: ABM=autobiographical memory; OI=object imagery; M=mean: SD=standard deviation; df=degrees of freedom; pBH=p-value adjusted for multiple comparisons 
following the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)'s step-up false discovery rate-controlling procedure; η2=effect size; Inv=involuntary; Vol=voluntary; a not included in the 
adjustment for multiple comparisons; b Ratings were made on 7-point scales; c Ratings were made on 5-point scales; d Memories were rated as specific or general. Means 
represent mean percentage of specific memories averaged across participants; e Memories were rated as remembered in shape of images or words. Means represent mean 
percentage of memories retrieved in shape of images averaged across participants; f Means represent mean percentage of memories referring to childhood/remote events. 
 
	  
